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PROSKAUER ROSE LLP V. TROICE: 




Over the last twenty years, the field of securities litigation has 
undergone a massive overhaul. Unhappy shareholders have been 
suing deep-pocketed defendants on an unprecedented level, often 
with substantial damages on the line. Both courts and legislatures 
have attempted to distinguish legitimate claims from mere vexatious 
litigation, but the line remains blurred. Since 2006, the Roberts Court 
has issued eight opinions on this topic, ranging from the reach of 
federal securities law, to class certification for securities fraud claims, 
to loss causation. In deciding Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice,1 the 
Supreme Court aims to bring clarity to this jurisprudence. 
In Proskauer, the Supreme Court will determine the proper scope 
of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA).2 
SLUSA, which was passed in 1998, precludes state law private class 
actions that allege “a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact 
in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.”3  The 
Supreme Court previously held that “[i]t is enough that the scheme to 
defraud and the sale of securities coincide.”4 However, because the 
Court did not clearly define the term “coincide,” there is looming 
uncertainty in the lower courts regarding what state law class action 
claims are now precluded by SLUSA.5 Proskauer will likely have 
major implications for the future of securities law, as it will more 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Duke University School of Law. 
 1.  Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, No. 12-88 (U.S. argued Oct. 7, 2013). 
 2.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb (West 2013). 
 3.  Id. § 78bb(f)(1)(A).  
 4.  SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 822 (2002). 
 5.  See Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 512 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Since Dabit, six of our sister 
circuit courts have tried to give dimension to the ‘coincide’ requirement announced in SEC v. 
Zandford and brought into the SLUSA scheme in Dabit.”), cert. granted sub nom. Proskauer 
Rose LLP v. Troice, 133 S. Ct. 978 (2013). 
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clearly define how close to the alleged fraud a transaction must be 
before it is precluded by SLUSA. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought 
suit against Allen Stanford for orchestrating one of the largest and 
most complex Ponzi schemes in United States history.6 Financial 
institutions managed by Mr. Stanford had encouraged investors to 
buy certificates of deposits (CDs) by promising that the CDs would 
yield above-market returns once they hit maturity, at which point 
investors could withdraw funds from them.7 Mr. Stanford had also 
misled investors by falsely assuring them that the CDs were backed 
by liquid assets.8 In reality, Stanford Investment Bank (SIB) did not 
have the necessary assets, reserves, and investments to meet its 
liabilities, and thus was only able to cover interest and redemption 
payments on its pre-existing CDs by selling new CDs to different 
investors.9 
In Roland v. Green10 and Farr v. Green,11 two groups of Louisiana 
investors (collectively, the Roland plaintiffs) filed separate class 
actions in state court against several defendants associated with Mr. 
Stanford (collectively, the SEI defendants). Among the SEI 
defendants were two entities owned by Mr. Stanford—the Stanford 
Trust Company and the SEI Investments Company. The Roland 
plaintiffs alleged that SIB sold CDs to the Stanford Trust Company, 
which in turn served as custodian for CD purchases made through 
individual retirement accounts (IRA). Although the CDs themselves 
were not covered securities—those listed on a regulated, national 
exchange—SIB deceived investors by claiming that the CDs were 
backed by covered securities.12 Moreover, the Roland plaintiffs 
alleged that the SEI Investments Company purposely misrepresented 
the value of the CDs.13 The SEI defendants responded by removing 
 
 6.  Id. at 508. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. at 522. 
 9.  Id. (citing Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 590 (5th Cir. 2011)). 
 10.  Roland v. Green, No. 3:2009cv00676 (M.D. La. Aug. 21, 2009). 
 11.  Farr v. Green, No. 3:2009cv00678 (M.D. La. Aug. 21, 2009). 
 12.  Roland, 675 F.3d at 508–09. 
 13.  See id. at 508 (“According to the plaintiffs, the Trust contracted with SEI to have SEI 
be the administrator of the Trust, thereby making SEI responsible for reporting the value of the 
CDs. Plaintiffs . . . allege misrepresentations by SEI induced them into using their IRA funds to 
invest in the CDs.”). 
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the case to federal court on the basis that SLUSA precluded the 
action from being tried in state court.14 The Northern District of Texas 
consolidated the two cases and, citing the lack of controlling Fifth 
Circuit authority, employed a test set forward by the Eleventh Circuit 
to determine the necessary connection between the alleged fraud and 
the transaction in covered securities for SLUSA preclusion.15 Under 
this test, if the grounds for the fraud claim are “in connection with the 
purchase or sale” of a security as defined in the statute, the case must 
be dismissed under SLUSA.16 Because the court found that the 
investors’ claims satisfied the “in connection with” test, the investors’ 
claims were precluded and the action was dismissed.17 
Next, the district court considered two additional claims relating 
to Mr. Stanford’s Ponzi scheme. A group of Latin American investors 
(the Troice plaintiffs) filed separate class actions against SIB’s 
insurance brokers (the Willis defendants) and SIB’s lawyers from 
Proskauer Rose LLP (the Proskauer defendants).18 The Troice 
plaintiffs brought their claims under Texas law, specifically accusing 
the Proskauer and Willis defendants of “violations of the Texas 
Securities Act, aiding and abetting these violations, and civil 
conspiracy.”19 However, the Troice plaintiffs did not allege that the 
Proskauer defendants made any misrepresentations to them directly.20 
After the ruling in Roland, both defendants moved to have their cases 
dismissed and the district court, citing its holding in Roland, 
acquiesced.21 Plaintiffs from all three cases appealed, and the Fifth 
Circuit consolidated the lawsuits for the purposes of oral argument 
and disposition.22 This commentary will place particular focus on the 
claims against the Proskauer defendants. 
 
 14.  Id. at 509. 
 15.  Id. at 510. 
 16.  See, e.g., Instituto de Prevision Militar v. Merrill Lynch (IPM), 546 F.3d 1340, 1350 
(11th Cir. 2008) (“Rather, to avoid preclusion under SLUSA, a claim for relief should clearly 
state the ground on which it is based, and that ground cannot be one that is ‘in connection with 
the purchase or sale’ of [any] security under § 10(b) and SLUSA.”). 
 17.  Roland, 675 F.3d at 510 (discussing the district court’s finding that the Roland 
plaintiffs’ “purchases of SIB CDs were induced by the misrepresentation that SIB invested in a 
portfolio including SLUSA-covered securities” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 18.  Id. at 509. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. Rather, the Proskauer defendants allegedly made misrepresentations to the SEC, 
claiming that the SEC had no authority to investigate the operations of Mr. Stanford and SIB. 
Id. at 524. 
 21.  Id. at 511 (discussing the district court’s holding that SLUSA precluded the Troice 
plaintiffs’ action). 
 22.  Id. 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. PSLRA and SLUSA 
In 1995 Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act (PSLRA) in the hopes that it would combat “perceived abuses of 
the class-action vehicle in litigation involving nationally traded 
securities.”23 Arguably the most profound impact of PSLRA was that 
it “impose[d] heightened pleading requirements in actions brought 
pursuant to § 10(b)24 and Rule 10b-5,”25 two of the most important 
rules targeting securities fraud. Although the reforms reduced the 
number of frivolous lawsuits brought in federal court, they also had 
an unintended effect: Many plaintiffs sought relief in state courts, 
where PSLRA was not applicable.26 In 1998, Congress responded by 
enacting SLUSA, which applied PSLRA at the state level, in order 
“[t]o stem this shift from Federal to State courts and prevent certain 
State private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being 
used to frustrate the objectives of” PSLRA.27 Particularly relevant to 
this case, SLUSA prohibits private class actions in state court alleging 
“a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with 
the purchase or sale of a covered security.”28 
In passing SLUSA, Congress intended not only to prevent 
plaintiffs from bypassing PSLRA, but also to recognize the 
importance of traditional state police powers in regulating certain 
types of securities fraud. When SLUSA was enacted, Congress 
expressly noted “the importance of maintaining the vital role of state 
 
 23.  Id. at 507 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 
(2006)). 
 24.  Section 10(b) makes it unlawful to “use or employ . . . any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may 
prescribe,” in connection with the purchase or sale of certain securities, including those 
registered on a national securities exchange. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2013). Rule 10b-5 is the 
rule the SEC promulgated under § 10(b). Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful to use any “device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud,” or make any misstatement or omission of material fact, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014). Courts have 
interpreted  § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as providing a private right of action. See Herman & 
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (stating that the existence of a private right of 
action under Section 10(b) . . . and Rule 10b-5 . . . is simply beyond peradventure”). 
 25.  H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
 26.  See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82 (“Rather than face the obstacles set in their path by the 
Reform Act, plaintiffs and their representatives began bringing class actions under state law, 
often in state court.”). 
 27.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 28.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb(f)(1)(A).  
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law in regulating non-national securities.”29 In particular, state law 
provides an important remedy for breach of fiduciary duty that, as the 
SEC pointed out in a recent study, is unavailable under federal law.30 
Additionally, circuit courts have emphasized that “[s]ince not every 
instance of financial unfairness or breach of fiduciary duty will 
constitute a fraudulent activity under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, federal 
courts should be wary of foreclosing common law breach of fiduciary 
duty actions which supplement existing federal or state statutes.”31 
B. Dabit and the “Coincide” Requirement 
In 2006, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the scope of 
SLUSA in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit.32 In 
Dabit, a former broker and former retail customers brought a class 
action in state court alleging that Merrill Lynch had breached its 
contracts with its customers and its fiduciary duties to its brokers by 
disseminating misleading research information.33 Specifically, the suit 
alleged that Merrill Lynch had given inaccurate research and 
investment recommendations to its brokers, which the brokers passed 
to the bank’s retail customers, resulting in the retail customers holding 
on to securities that were overvalued.34 Moreover, the broker-
plaintiffs alleged that the misrepresentations damaged their 
reputations with customers, resulting in a loss of commission fees.35 
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court looked to Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,36 in which it highlighted the 
“widespread recognition that suits by nonpurchasers and nonsellers 
present a special risk of vexatious litigation” to companies.37 The 
Dabit Court noted that the same concern was echoed by Congress 
 
 29.  S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 8 (1998) (noting “that in order to avoid . . . thwarting . . .  the 
purpose of the [PSLRA], national standards for nationally traded securities must be enacted, 
while preserving the appropriate enforcement powers of state regulators, and the right of 
individuals to bring suit”). 
 30.  See SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND 
BROKER-DEALERS 54 (2011), available at http://sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf. 
 31.  See, e.g., Gochnauer v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 810 F.2d 1043, 1049 (11th Cir. 
1987). 
 32.  547 U.S. 71 (2006). 
 33.  Id. at 75. 
 34.  Id. A “holder” class action is distinct from a “typical Rule 10b-5 class action in only 
one respect: It is brought by holders instead of purchasers or sellers.” Id. at 89. 
 35.  Id. at 76. 
 36.  421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
 37.  Id. at 740. 
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when it passed both PSLRA and SLUSA.38 Additionally, prior cases 
had construed the “in connection with” language used in § 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 broadly, and applied this precedent to determine that 
under SLUSA, preclusion applies when fraud merely “coincides” with 
the securities transaction.39 Congress had not only used the same 
words in enacting SLUSA as it did in § 10(b), but also had “used them 
in a provision that appears in the same statute as § 10(b).”40 Based on 
these principles, the Dabit Court held that SLUSA’s “in connection 
with” requirement possesses the same meaning as that of § 10(b), and 
that state-law holder class actions are also precluded under SLUSA.41 
C. Circuit Courts Struggle with Dabit 
Since the Dabit decision, no fewer than six different circuit courts 
have attempted to define the scope of SLUSA’s “coincide” 
requirement.42 The Eleventh Circuit, in Instituto de Prevision Militar v. 
Merrill Lynch,43 held that the “coincide” requirement is met if either 
“fraud that induced [plaintiffs] to invest with [the defendant(s)] or a 
fraudulent scheme . . . coincided and depended upon the purchase or 
sale of [covered] securities.”44 There, a Guatemalan government 
agency, which had administered a pension for the country’s military 
veterans, brought claims against Merrill Lynch.45 The agency had 
invested in the Pension Fund of America (PFA) and, along with other 
PFA investors, sued Merrill Lynch for “actively promot[ing] PFA and 
vouching for the character of PFA’s principals.”46 The Eleventh Circuit 
ruled in favor of the defendants, holding that SLUSA precluded the 
 
 38.  See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that prior to the 
enactment of PSLRA, “nuisance filings, targeting of deep-pocket defendants, vexatious 
discovery requests, and ‘manipulation by class action lawyers of the clients whom they 
purportedly represent’ had become rampant” (citation omitted)). 
 39.  See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 85 (“Under our precedents, it is enough that the fraud alleged 
‘coincide’ with a securities transaction—whether by the plaintiff or by someone else.” (citing 
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997))). 
 40.  See id. at 96 (noting that “Congress can hardly have been unaware of the broad 
construction adopted by both this Court and the SEC when it imported the key phrase—‘in 
connection with the purchase or sale’—into SLUSA’s core provision”). 
 41.  See id. at 89 (“The misconduct of which respondent complains here—fraudulent 
manipulation of stock prices—unquestionably qualifies as fraud ‘in connection with the 
purchase or sale’ of securities . . . .”). 
 42.  See Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 512 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Since Dabit, six of our sister 
circuit courts have tried to give dimension to the ‘coincide’ requirement . . . .”), cert. granted sub 
nom. Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, 133 S. Ct. 978 (2013). 
 43.  546 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 44.  Id. at 1349.  
 45.  Id. at 1342. 
 46.  Id. at 1343 (alteration in original). 
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agency’s claims because their complaint was about “fraud that 
induced it to invest with PFA, which means that its claims [we]re ‘in 
connection with the purchase or sale’ of a security under SLUSA.”47 
The Ninth Circuit, in Madden v. Cowen & Co.,48 interpreted the 
“coincide” requirement slightly differently.49 In Madden, the plaintiffs 
were shareholders of two medical care providers that were looking to 
be bought by a larger company.50 The plaintiffs had retained an 
investment bank to help them look for prospective buyers.51 And the 
investment bank had suggested a stock-swap merger with a publicly 
traded company. However, the publicly traded company’s stock 
tumbled soon after it acquired the plaintiffs’ companies.52 The 
plaintiffs then sued the investment bank in state court for negligent 
misrepresentation and professional negligence.53 Looking to Dabit’s 
ruling that SLUSA must be interpreted in the same light as § 10(b), 
the court concluded that the “coincide” requirement is met if the 
alleged fraud and the sale of stock are “more than tangentially 
related.”54 Applying this test, the court determined that the 
“misrepresentations and omissions alleged . . . [were] more than 
tangentially related to [the shareholders’] purchase of the [publicly-
traded company’s] securities,” and thus the class action was 
precluded.55 
Most recently, the Second Circuit in Romano v. Kazacos56 held 
that the “coincide” requirement is met when the “plaintiff’s claims 
‘turn on injuries caused by acting on misleading investment advice’—
that is, where plaintiff’s claims ‘necessarily allege,’ ‘necessarily 
involve,’ or ‘rest on’ the purchase or sale of securities.”57 There, 
retirees of Xerox and Kodak alleged that defendant Morgan Stanley 
“misrepresented that if appellants were to retire early, their 
investment savings would be sufficient to support them through 
 
 47.  Id. at 1349. 
 48.  576 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 49.  See id. at 965–66 (“Under our Section 10(b) cases, a misrepresentation is ‘in 
connection with’ the purchase or sale of securities if there is ‘a relationship in which the fraud 
and the stock sale coincide or are more than tangentially related.’” (quoting Falkowski v. 
Imation Corp., 309 F.3d 1123, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002))). 
 50.  Id. at 962. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 962–63. 
 53.  Id. at 963. 
 54.  Id. at 965–66. 
 55.  Id. at 966 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 56.  609 F.3d 512 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 57.  Id. at 522 (citation omitted). 
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retirement.”58 As a result, the retirees had “deposited their retirement 
savings into Morgan Stanley IRA accounts, where covered securities 
were purchased on their behalf.”59 The court found that SLUSA 
preclusion applied because the defendants had fraudulently induced 
the appellants into investing in securities by misleading them about 
future returns.60 
IV. HOLDING 
After reviewing both Dabit and the legislative history of PSLRA 
and SLUSA, the Fifth Circuit analyzed whether the “in connection 
with” requirement of SLUSA precluded the plaintiffs’ claims.61  The 
circuit court adopted the view of the Ninth Circuit and ruled that the 
SEI and Willis defendants’ actions were too far removed from the 
securities transaction to satisfy SLUSA’s “coincide” requirement.62 
The Fifth Circuit thus reversed the district court’s ruling.63 
Additionally, with regard to the aiding and abetting claims against the 
Proskauer defendants, the court concluded that because the alleged 
misrepresentations were even further removed from the 
misrepresentations made by the other defendants, SLUSA preclusion 
did not apply.64 
A. The “In Connection With” Requirement 
The Fifth Circuit noted that courts “do not write on a blank slate” 
in determining the scope of the “in connection with” requirement of 
SLUSA.65 Using the same line of reasoning as the Supreme Court in 
Dabit,66 the circuit court concluded that Congress had intended the 
“in connection with” requirement to be interpreted in the same 
manner as in § 10(b).67 
 
 
 58.  Id. at 515. 
 59.  Id. at 520. 
 60.  See id. at 523. 
 61.  See Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 518 (5th Cir. 2012) (“It is against this backdrop that 
we must go about formulating our standard for judging the connection of claims like the 
Appellants' to the purchase or sale of covered securities.”), cert. granted sub nom. Proskauer 
Rose LLP v. Troice, 133 S. Ct. 978 (2013). 
 62.  Id. at 519–20, 522. 
 63.  Id. at 523. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 511. 
 66.  See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85-86 (2006). 
 67.  Roland, 675 F.3d at 512.   
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The Fifth Circuit also found “Congress’s explicit concern about 
the distinction between national, covered securities, and other, 
uncovered securities” to be very persuasive in balancing the rights of 
federal and state courts to hear claims relating to securities fraud. 
After analyzing the congressional record and highlighting the need to 
respect traditional state police powers,68 the court concluded that 
Congress intended SLUSA to apply only to “transactions involving 
national securities.”69  The court reasoned that because companies do 
not have any control over their stock after their initial public offering, 
litigation concerning these securities should be heard at the federal 
level, so that “national issuers are not subject to any of fifty different 
state systems.”70 
In reaching this conclusion, however, the court noted that non-
national securities were still under state law jurisdiction and thus were 
not unregulated.71 In enacting PSLRA and SLUSA, Congress had to 
balance the need for “national standards for securities class action 
lawsuits involving nationally traded securities, while preserving the 
appropriate enforcement powers of State securities regulators and not 
changing the current treatment of individual lawsuits.”72 An 
overbroad reading of SLUSA, Congress feared, would potentially 
destabilize creditor-debtor regimes.73 Given that nearly every 
company owns some covered securities, and that most are backed by a 
portfolio in the same way as SIB’s CD’s, the court concluded that 
following the district court’s view that preclusion should apply merely 
because of some vague connection to a covered security “would be a 
major change in the scope of SLUSA”;74 it would become far too easy 




 68.  See id. at 517 (“‘[T]he securities governed by this bill—and it is important to emphasize 
this point—are by definition trading on national exchanges. As we all know, securities traded on 
national exchanges are bought and sold by investors in every State, and those investors rely on 
information distributed on a national basis.’” (quoting 144 CONG. REC. 4799 (1998) (statement 
of Sen. Joseph Lieberman))); see also 144 CONG. REC. 10780 (1998) (statement of Rep. Anna 
Eshoo) (“This legislation is limited in scope and only affects class action lawsuits involving 
nationally traded securities.”). 
 69.  Roland, 675 F.3d at 517. 
 70.  See H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 15 (1998) (Conf. Rep.). 
 71.  Roland, 675 F.3d at 518. 
 72.  See H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 2. 
 73.  Id.; see also Janvey v. Adams, 588 F.3d 831, 835 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 74.  Roland, 675 F.3d at 518.  
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In determining when a claim is precluded by SLUSA, the court 
reasoned that the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit cases were 
most relevant to defining the “coincide” requirement because these 
courts had previously considered the issue.75 The court began with the 
Eleventh Circuit test, which “identifies the two different perspectives 
from which courts approach the question of connectivity.”76 The first 
perspective analyzes the claims from the plaintiff’s perspective, by 
asking whether the plaintiffs were induced into believing that they 
were either investing in covered securities or investing in transactions 
because of representations regarding transactions in covered 
securities.77 Conversely, the second perspective looks at the allegations 
from the view of the defendant, and asks whether or not the 
defendant would have still committed the fraud without the alleged 
covered securities transaction.78 The court reasoned that a plaintiff-
oriented perspective unnecessarily imported a causation requirement 
into SLUSA analysis79 and that the defendant-oriented perspective 
was more in line with the Court’s statements in Dabit.80 
After concluding that “the defendant-oriented perspective is the 
proper point of view from which to consider the allegations,”81 the 
Fifth Circuit eliminated the Second and Eleventh Circuit tests 
because each was “too stringent a standard.”82 Instead, the court 
adopted the Ninth Circuit’s test from Madden as the “best articulation 
of the ‘coincide’ requirement” because it followed Supreme Court 
 
 75.  See id. at 513 (“The Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have, however, attempted to 
give dimension to what is sufficiently connected/coincidental to a transaction in covered 
securities to trigger SLUSA preclusion.”). 
 76.  See id. at 518–19 (“IPM held that the ‘coincide’ requirement is met if either ‘fraud . . . 
induced [plaintiffs] to invest with [the defendant(s)]’ or ‘a fraudulent scheme . . . coincided and 
depended upon the purchase or sale of [covered] securities.’” (quoting IPM, 546 F.3d 1340 (11th 
Cir 2008))). 
 77.  See IPM, 546 F.3d at 1349 (focusing on whether the complaint alleged a “fraud . . . 
[that] induced [plaintiffs] to invest with [the defendant(s)]” or “a fraudulent scheme . . . [that] 
coincided and depended upon the purchase or sale of [covered] securities”).  
 78. See Roland, 675 F.3d at 519 (“The ‘depended upon’ prong . . . essentially ask[s] whether 
the defendants' fraudulent scheme would have been successful without the (representations 
about) transactions in covered securities.”).  
 79.  See id. (“By tying the ‘coincide’ requirement to ‘inducement,’ [the plaintiffs’ 
perspective] unnecessarily imports causation into a test whose language (‘coincide’) specifically 
disclaims it.”). 
 80.  Id. (“The defendant-oriented perspective, like IPM's ‘depends upon’ prong, is more 
faithful to the Court's statement that ‘[t]he requisite showing ... is deception in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security, not deception of an identifiable purchaser or seller.’” 
(quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006))). 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
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precedent while simultaneously giving due weight to the major policy 
and legislative concerns underlying SLUSA.83 In particular, the court 
noted that the Madden test prevented SLUSA from being “construed 
so broadly as to [encompass] every common-law fraud that happens 
to involve [covered] securities.”84 The Fifth Circuit concluded that in 
order for SLUSA preclusion to apply, the fraud would have to be 
“more than tangentially related to (real or purported) transactions in 
covered securities.”85 
Although the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court’s 
determination that “the CDs were uncovered securities,” they felt that 
it was necessary to further scrutinize the “schemes and purposes of 
the frauds alleged by the Roland Plaintiffs.”86 In applying the Madden 
test, the Fifth Circuit noted that the actual “heart” of the fraud was 
SIB’s misrepresentation to investors that the CDs were a “safe and 
secure” investment.87 Although the district court reasoned that the 
plaintiffs’ claims were precluded because the CDs were backed in 
part by “covered securities,” the Fifth Circuit instead concluded that it 
was “but one of a host of (mis)representations made to the plaintiffs 
in an attempt to lure them into buying the worthless CDs.”88 Similarly, 
the fact that the CDs were marketed with references to SIB’s 
portfolio was considered too vague and “tangential to the schemes 
advanced by the SEI and Willis Defendants.”89 Finally, although a few 
plaintiffs sold covered securities in order to finance the purchase of 
the CDs, this only constituted a tangential relationship because SIB 
did not directly convince the investors to sell the securities.90 
 
 
 83.  Id. at 519–20 (citing Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 84.  Id. at 512 (quoting SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002)). 
 85.  Id. at 520.  
 86.  Id. at 521.  
 87.  Id. at 522 (“For example, as alleged by the Roland Plaintiffs, the CDs were principally 
promoted as being preferable to other investments because of their liquidity, consistently high 
rates of return, and the fact that SEI and other regulators were keeping a watchful eye on 
SIB.”).  
 88.  Id. at 521. 
 89.  Id. at 522. 
 90.  See id. at 523 (“[Unlike cases in which] the entirety of the fraud depended upon the 
tortfeasor convincing the victims of those fraudulent schemes to sell their covered securities in 
order for the fraud to be accomplished, the allegations here are not so tied with the sale of 
covered securities.”).  
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B. Aiding and Abetting 
Next, the Fifth Circuit ruled that SLUSA did not preclude the 
aiding and abetting claims against the Proskauer defendants.91 The 
court viewed the claims against the Proskauer defendants as 
“different from those alleged against the other defendants” in that the 
plaintiffs did not allege that the Proskauer defendants made any 
misrepresentations to them personally.92  Instead, the court focused on 
Proskauer’s misrepresentations to the SEC, in informing the SEC that 
it could not investigate the operations of Mr. Stanford and SIB.93 The 
court reasoned that because of Proskauer’s misrepresentations, the 
fraud was allowed to continue and the Troice plaintiffs were harmed.94  
Based on the Ninth Circuit test, however, these actions were even 
further removed from the fraud than the misrepresentation made by 
SIB.95 Because the misrepresentations made by the Proskauer 
defendants “were not more than tangentially related to the purchase 
or sale of covered securities,” SLUSA preclusion did not apply.96 
The Supreme Court granted the Proskauer defendants’ writ of 
certiorari to determine the scope of SLUSA’s “in connection with” 
requirement, and specifically to determine whether it precludes a 
class action brought under state law “where the alleged purchase or 
sale of a covered security is more than tangentially related to the 
heart, crux, or gravamen of the alleged fraud.”97  
V. ARGUMENTS 
A.  Arguments for Petitioner, Proskauer Rose LLP 
1. “In Connection With” does Not Equate to “Coincide” 
  Petitioner argues that the “coincide” test employed by the Fifth 
Circuit is far more restrictive than Congress had intended.98 SLUSA 
was enacted as “remedial legislation, with an expansive preclusive 
 
 91.  Id. at 524. 
 92.  Id. at 523. 
 93.  Id. at 524. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
       97.   Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, 133 S. Ct. 978 (2013); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 
Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, No. 12-88 (U.S. July 18, 2012). The Court also granted petitions 
for writ of certiorari submitted by several of the other defendants in the proceedings below. 
 98.  Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3–4, Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, No. 12-88 (U.S. Aug. 
19, 2013). 
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effect.”99 Moreover, SLUSA was intended to mirror the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of § 10(b)’s “in connection with” 
requirement.100 Petitioner argues that while the “coincide” 
requirement might be sufficient to meet the requirements of § 10(b), 
it is not a necessary factor for preclusion to apply.101 In addition to 
Dabit, Petitioner relies on United States v. O’Hagan,102 where the 
Supreme Court held that the misappropriation prong of § 10(b) was 
satisfied because “the securities transaction and the breach of duty . . . 
coincide[d].”103 Moreover, Petitioner notes that in SEC v. Zandford,104 
the Court stated that it is “enough that the scheme to defraud and the 
sale of securities coincide.”105 In each of these cases, the Supreme 
Court held that “the scope of SLUSA or § 10(b), as applicable, was 
more expansive than the lower courts believed.”106 Although a 
showing that the two events coincided could certainly meet SLUSA’s 
requirement, the lack of such a showing does not necessarily mean 
that the action should be precluded.107 
2. Legislative Intent and Policy Considerations 
Petitioner argues that adopting the Fifth Circuit’s “coincide” test 
would negatively impact the future of securities law.108 For example, 
the Fifth Circuit ruled that the alleged fraud did not meet the 
appropriate SLUSA standard due to the “multiple layers of 
separation” between the misrepresentation and the investment.109 
However, complex frauds, particularly those of the magnitude carried 
out by Mr. Stanford, will inevitably be comprised of such layers; to 
prevent SLUSA from applying to these types of cases “simply cannot 
be squared with the scope of § 10(b)’s ‘in connection with’ 




 99.  Brief for Petitioner, Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, No. 12-88 (U.S. May 3, 2013). 
 100.  Id. at 5. 
 101.  Id. at 18. 
 102.  521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 103.  Id. at 656. 
 104.  535 U.S. 813 (2002). 
 105.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 99, at 18 (citing Zandford, 535 U.S. at 822). 
 106.  Id. at 19 (citing Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820–21). 
 107.  Id. at 21. 
 108.  Id. at 23–24. 
 109.  Id.  
 110.  Id. at 24. 
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Petitioner bases much of its policy argument around the Supreme 
Court’s admonition that the “in connection with” requirement be 
given broad construction.111 Petitioner contends that Respondents’ 
own allegations “make plain that SIB’s false promise to invest 
proceeds of CD sales in covered securities was part of Stanford’s 
fraudulent scheme.”112 Petitioner claims that SIB’s ownership of a 
portfolio of covered securities is irrelevant, as the actual 
misrepresentation was made concerning the purchase of covered 
securities.113 As this is what Respondents allege, the Court “need not 
go beyond their averments to conclude that SIB’s misrepresentations 
were ‘in connection with’ the purchase of covered securities.”114 
3. SLUSA’s “In Connection With” Requirement was Satisfied 
Next, Petitioner contends that because investors were induced 
into selling covered securities to finance the purchase of the CDs, 
SLUSA’s “in connection with” requirement was met.115 Petitioner 
claims the actual objective of the fraud scheme is not “essential to the 
‘in connection with’ analysis”; once the securities transaction is a part 
of the fraud, it is irrelevant what actually happens to the revenue.116 
The Supreme Court has ruled that it is irrelevant where the money 
originated from, as long as “there was a ‘sale’ of a security and . . . 
fraud was used ‘in connection with’ it.”117 Here, the fraud specifically 
targeted individuals who were “most likely to sell ‘covered securities’ 
to buy SIB CDs.”118 Consequently, Petitioner argues that Mr. 
Stanford’s targeting of these individuals was integral to the 
continuation of the fraud and that a covered securities transaction 
was therefore foreseeable.119 
Similarly, Petitioner alleges that Mr. Stanford’s misrepresentations 
concerning investing revenue from CD sales in “covered securities” 
are sufficient to meet the “in connection” requirement of SLUSA.120 
Mr. Stanford’s brokers and advisors had been told that the 
 
 111.  Id. at 13. 
 112.  Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 98, at 11. 
 113.  Id. at 13–14. 
 114.  Id. at 14. 
 115.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 99, at 33–34. 
 116.  Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 98, at 7. 
 117.  Id. at 8 (quoting Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Case. Co., 404 U.S. 
6, 12 (1971)). 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id at 14–15. 
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“liquidity/marketability of SIB’s invested assets” was the “most 
important factor to provide security to SIB clients.”121 Coupled with 
the fact that the Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted the “in 
connection with” requirement broadly, Petitioner claims that these 
misrepresentations are sufficiently close to the alleged fraud to 
warrant SLUSA preclusion.122 
4. Aiding and Abetting 
Finally, with regard to the “aiding and abetting” claims, Petitioner 
argues that part of Congress’s intent in enacting SLUSA was to 
prevent deep-pocketed defendants from being targeted for private 
litigation.123 However, if such litigation were to encompass third-party 
companies as well, defendants would find it difficult to obtain help 
from professionals due to the increased cost of doing business.124 
Lawyers, Petitioner argues, would “find their loyalties divided 
between the interests of their clients and their own financial interests 
in avoiding exposure to vexatious lawsuits.”125 In keeping with the 
legislative intent of SLUSA, Petitioner contends that the aiding and 
abetting claims against Proskauer must be preempted as well.126 
B. Arguments for Respondents, Aggrieved Investors 
1. “In Connection With” Must be Construed Narrowly 
Respondents argue that neither their supposed sale of covered 
securities to purchase the CDs nor SIB’s claim that it owned a 
portfolio of liquid assets triggered preclusion under SLUSA.127 
Furthermore, the SEI defendants’ actions fail to meet the “coincide” 
requirement as set by Dabit.128 The allegations merely stated that SIB 
 
 121.  Id. at 13 (citation omitted). 
 122.  Id. at 11. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 825 (2002) (noting that a 
misrepresentation and securities transaction need only “coincide” to be sufficiently connected); 
Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y., 404 U.S. at 12 (holding that the two need only “touch”).  
 123.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 99, at 21–22.  
 124.  Id. at 23 (“Not only does the availability of liability insurance enhance the risk that law 
firms will be targeted as deep pockets, the cost of securing insurance will certainly increase, 
resulting in increased costs to clients and clients’ investors.” (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 125.  Id. at 24. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Brief of Respondents at 19–22, Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, Nos. 12-79, 12-86 and 
12-88 (U.S. July 18, 2013) (rejecting Petitioner’s claim that because at least one of the 
Respondents allegedly sold covered securities to purchase the CDs, SLUSA preclusion applies). 
 128.  See id. at 8 (“SIB did not make its misrepresentations contemporaneously with . . . the 
same transaction as its separate supposed purchase of ‘liquid assets’; the two thus did not 
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told its employees to push the CDs, not that the objective of the fraud 
was to steal the covered securities.129 Given that “securities laws do 
apply to a scheme in which the victim is induced to sell securities and 
then deprived of the proceeds,”130 the employees were not concerned 
about the origins of the money used to purchase the CDs.131 Therefore, 
Respondents contend, SIB’s actions are at most tangentially related 
to the fraud. 
Similarly, Respondents claim that because the portfolio consisted 
only marginally of covered securities, applying SLUSA preclusion 
would lead to absurd results.132 Under this interpretation, companies 
would be able to avoid liability simply by mentioning some vague 
relationship to “covered securities” when marketing products to 
investors.133 Yet, simply making misrepresentations concerning 
covered securities that SIB “held” would be insufficient to trigger 
preclusion under federal securities law as well.134 Because the 
supposed covered securities had already been “purchased” by the 
time SIB made its misrepresentations to investors, the “in connection 
with” requirement was not met.135 
2. Cases Presented by Petitioner are Irrelevant 
Additionally, Respondents contend that the “in connection with” 
interpretation under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has never been 
interpreted in the manner Petitioner advances. No decision has 
extended the statute and rule to cases where a non-security was 
fraudulently sold after “the seller misrepresent[ed] its intent to buy 
covered securities in which no other party w[ould] hold any 
interest.”136 Instead, Petitioner focuses on cases where the “victim 
arguably purchases a share of the covered securities themselves,”137 
“the defendant’s misrepresentations manipulated the market for 
 
‘coincide.’”). 
 129.  Id. at 20 (citation omitted). 
 130.  Id. (citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Case. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971)). 
 131.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 132.  Id. at 20–21.  
 133.  See id. at 11 (“On petitioner’s reading, every false statement about securities 
ownership—whether in a credit application, a job interview, or anywhere else—potentially 
constitutes securities fraud.”). 
 134.  Id. at 22 (“The federal securities laws . . . apply only to misrepresentations in 
connection with the ‘purchase or sale’ of regulated securities.”). 
 135.  Id. at 24–25. 
 136.  Id. at 12. 
 137.  Id. at 16. 
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covered securities,”138 or “plaintiffs lost money when funds ostensibly 
invested for their benefit were misappropriated.”139 Respondents 
conclude that Petitioner is unable to find a relevant case because the 
misrepresentation here was merely tangentially related to a covered 
securities transaction and, therefore, SLUSA does not apply.140 
3. SLUSA’s Scope of Protections Differs from that of § 10(b) 
Finally, Respondents argue that holding in favor of Petitioner 
would undermine the legislative intent behind SLUSA.141 The “courts 
should assume that ‘the historic police powers of the States’ are not 
superseded ‘unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.’”142 However, Respondents argue that it was “Congress’s 
decision in SLUSA to preserve—not to override or displace—the 
states’ historical role in providing civil remedies for fraud.”143 In fact, 
though Congress premised SLUSA’s scope on § 10(b), it specifically 
noted that SLUSA only applied to “covered securities” whereas § 
10(b) encompassed all securities.144 Moreover, when Congress adopted 
the phrase and definition of “covered security,” Congress specifically 
mentioned that it did not intend “to alter, limit, expand, or otherwise 
affect in any way any State statutory or common law with respect to 
fraud or deceit . . . in connection with securities or securities 
transactions.”145 Thus, although Congress may have modeled SLUSA’s 
“in connection with” requirement after § 10(b), Respondents argue 
that adopting Petitioner’s interpretations would go against legislative 





 138.  Id. at 39 (citing U.S. Mortgage, Inc. v. Saxton, 494 F.3d 833, 845 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 139.  Id. at 33 (citing Grippo v. Perazzo, 357 F.3d 1218, 1220–21 (11th Cir. 2004)). 
 140.  See id. at 34 (“Petitioner’s inability to cite a single case on point is no surprise. The 
securities laws do not apply to a party’s sale of a non-covered asset through a false statement of 
an intention later to buy a covered security for itself.”). 
 141.  See id. at 11 (noting that “Congress did not intend to undo the established allocation of 
federal and state regulatory authority” by allowing any false statement about securities 
ownership to constitute securities fraud). 
 142.  Id. at 28–29 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 143.  Id. at 43–44. 
 144.  Id. at 21. 
 145.  Id. at 45 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 34 (1996)). 
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VI. ANALYSIS 
In deciding Proskauer, the Supreme Court must balance the broad 
interpretation of § 10(b) as stated in Dabit with the traditional power 
of states to regulate the use of class actions as a consumer remedy.146 
The Supreme Court should hold for Respondents and affirm the Fifth 
Circuit’s ruling because the misrepresentations made by SIB were not 
directly “in connection with” a purchase or sale of securities. 
Proskauer is distinguishable from precedent cited by Petitioner as the 
misstatements did not “coincide” with a securities transaction.147 
Moreover, from a policy perspective, holding in favor of Respondents 
will preserve the important balance of power between the federal and 
state in adjudicating securities fraud. Even though a broad 
interpretation of the “coincide” requirement would only preclude 
state law class actions, in practice, the cost of individual litigation 
would be prohibitively expensive to be a feasible alternative to class 
actions.148  In addition, the Court should hold that the aiding and 
abetting claims against the Proskauer defendants are not precluded, 
as the Proskauer defendants’ actions are even further removed from 
the sale or purchase of covered securities. 
A. Monitoring the Scope of SLUSA 
Due to the strong policy justifications of SLUSA, the Supreme 
Court will likely place great weight on legislative intent. The 
legislative history demonstrates that Congress had a strong interest in 
“preserving the appropriate enforcement power of state regulators 
and the right of individuals to bring suit.”149 And a reasonably narrow 
interpretation of the “coincide” requirement protects both interests. 
Moreover, adopting Petitioner’s argument and precluding all state 
action that “bears only an attenuated connection to the challenged 
transaction” would inevitably curtail the ability of states to regulate 
 
 146.  See, e.g., Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (“So we start with the assumption that the historic police 
powers of the States were not superseded . . . unless that was clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.”). 
 147.  Brief of Respondents, supra note 127, at 37 (“Petitioner never offers a theory of how a 
statement like SIB’s could be material to its own purchase or sale of a covered security.”). 
 148.  Brief of Sixteen Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 17, 
Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, Nos. 12-79, 12-86 and 12-88 (U.S. July 24, 2013) [hereinafter 
Brief of Sixteen Law Professors] (“Denial of class relief under both federal and state law as a 
matter of statutory interpretation would mean no relief at all.”). 
 149.  S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 8 (1998); see also 144 CONG. REC. S4791 (1998) (statement of 
Sen. Chris Dodd) (“It will not affect any suit, class action or otherwise, against penny stocks or 
any stock that is not traded on a national exchange.”). 
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corporate laws that have traditionally been within their jurisdiction.150 
Furthermore, prior Supreme Court cases point to a strong 
presumption against federal preemption of state law causes of 
action,151 further supporting a narrower reading of “coincide.” Given 
that “every bank and almost every company owns some covered 
securities,”152 the Supreme Court should not allow preemption to 
extend as far as Petitioner claims it does. 
The Court has also held that SLUSA applies only to 
misrepresentations that are “in connection with the purchase or sale 
of a covered security,”153 as opposed to simply being in connection 
with a security itself.154 Respondents invested money in CDs, but there 
was no actual transaction with regard to such securities. Furthermore, 
as the Fifth Circuit noted, allowing SLUSA to apply here merely 
because Petitioner  deceived investors into believing that the CDs 
were backed by covered securities would allow any defendant to 
avoid liability for securities fraud simply by mentioning any type of 
relationship to covered securities during a marketing pitch.155 
Moreover, the Supreme Court emphasized that the “scope of SLUSA 
is about the security, rather than either the issuer or the alleged 
fraud.”156 Therefore, in applying the rule, the nature of the investment 
itself is most crucial.  Here, Respondents merely bought CDs from 
SIB, and in so doing, “no one intended that any party to the 
transaction would obtain any interest in any covered security.”157 
 
 150.  Brief of Sixteen Law Professors, supra note 148, at 3.  
 151.  Id. at 19 (“The presumption against preemption is particularly strong where a 
conclusion that claims are preempted would eliminate remedies traditionally available under 
state law.”); see also Bates v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (“If Congress 
had intended to deprive injured parties of a long available form of compensation, it surely 
would have expressed that intent more clearly.”).  
 152.  Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 518 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Proskauer 
Rose LLP v. Troice, 133 S. Ct. 978 (2013). 
 153.  See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002).  
 154.  See, e.g., id. at 822 (ruling that the securities fraud must “coincide” with a securities 
transaction). Previous cases required, “at a minimum, a direct or indirect purchase or sale of 
covered securities, or a contract to do so.” Brief of Sixteen Law Professors, supra note 148, at 
12–13. 
 155.  Roland, 675 F.3d at 522 (“Precluding any group claim against any such debt issue 
merely because the issuer advertises that it owns these assets in its portfolio would be a major 
change in the scope of SLUSA.”). 
 156.  Brief of Sixteen Law Professors, supra note 148, at 28 (alteration in original) (citing 
Morrison v. Aust. Nat’l Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010)). 
 157.  Id. at 29. 
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B. Aiding and Abetting 
If the Supreme Court rules that the misrepresentations made by 
SIB were too far removed from the covered securities transaction to 
be precluded by SLUSA, then the argument for precluding the claims 
against the Proskauer defendants are even more tenuous. Though 
Petitioner claims that SIB misrepresented the “liquidity, soundness, 
and safety of investing in the CDs,”158 The Proskauer defendants made 
no direct misrepresentation to Respondents. Furthermore, because 
aiding and abetting claims traditionally have been adjudicated under 
state law, public policy would further direct the Court to rule in favor 
of Respondents. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should affirm the Fifth Circuit’s decision and 
hold that SLUSA precludes an action where the alleged purchase or 
sale of a covered security is not “more than tangentially related” to 
the “heart, crux, or gravamen” of the alleged fraud.159 The Court 
should limit the scope of SLUSA in order to ensure that traditional 
state police powers—including the ability to regulate consumer 
remedies such as class action lawsuits and the internal workings of 
corporations with sufficient ties to the state—are kept intact. If the 
Court were to hold otherwise, the implications for many investment 
vehicles that merely “touch” covered securities could be quite 
substantial. Companies would find themselves able to avoid class 
actions through SLUSA preclusion simply by claiming some type of 
relationship to covered securities. There is little to suggest Congress 
intended such a result. 
 
 
 158.  Roland, 675 F.3d at 523. 
 159.  See id. at 521 (“[W]e find the references to SIB’s portfolio being backed by ‘covered 
securities’ to be merely tangentially related to the ‘heart,’ ‘crux,’ or ‘gravamen’ of the 
defendants’ fraud.”). 
